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Abstract Autonomous e-coaching systems offer their
users suggestions for action, thereby affecting the user’s
decision-making process. More specifically, the sugges-
tions that these systems make influence the options for
action that people actually consider. Surprisingly though,
options and the corresponding process of option genera-
tion—a decision-making stage preceding intention forma-
tion and action selection—have received very little
attention in the various disciplines studying decision
making. We argue that this neglect is unjustified and that it
is important, particularly for designers of autonomous
e-coaching systems, to understand how human option
generation works. The aims of this paper are threefold. The
first aim is to generate awareness with designers of
autonomous e-coaching systems that these systems do in
fact influence their users’ options. The second is to show
that understanding the interplay between a person’s options
and the e-coaching system’s suggestions is important for
improving the effectiveness of the system. The third is that
the very same interplay is also crucial for designing
e-coaching systems that respect people’s autonomy.
Keywords Option generation  Decision making 
E-coaching  Effectiveness  Ethics  Autonomy
1 Introduction
Intelligent, autonomous e-coaching systems are becoming
more and more mainstream, offering people a wide variety
of strategies and techniques intended to help them fulfill
their goals for self-improvement (Blanson Henkemans
et al. 2009; Klein et al. 2011; Kaptein et al. 2012). While
these innovative systems offer new and exciting opportu-
nities for individualized coaching in a range of different
domains, they also highlight a gap in our current under-
standing of the intimate relationship between an e-coaching
system on the one hand, and a human user on the other
hand, and the effect that this relationship has on the user in
terms of his or her self-directedness, or autonomy. As
Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa have rightly observed,
‘information technology is never neutral’ (Oinas-Kukko-
nen and Harjumaa 2008, p. 166), implying that autonomous
support systems are always nudging people’s behavior in
one direction or another by the type of information they
present and the way in which they present it.
This aspect is amplified in autonomous e-coaching
systems, especially those that combine persuasive tech-
niques such as reduction, tunneling, tailoring and self-
monitoring (Fogg 2003) with personalization (Berkovsky
et al. 2012) to actively influence their user’s behavior in
order to achieve lasting behavior change. A prominent
example of such a system is Klein, Mogles and Van Wis-
sen’s eMate (Klein et al. 2011), which promotes a healthy
lifestyle for people managing chronic illness (e.g., diabetes
type 2, HIV or cardiovascular disease) by inferring the
person’s behavior change state from individual measures
and sending tailored motivational text messages to influ-
ence that state if deemed necessary. Clearly, there is a
positive drive behind these innovations, but what is striking
is that there seems to be very little awareness (except for a
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meta-study by Torning and Oinas-Kukkonen 2009) that
such systems are in fact interfering with people’s decision-
making process by directly or indirectly offering sugges-
tions for action. This interference raises ethical concerns.
Given that ‘being an autonomous person’ seems to entail
that one decides on the basis of options that are in some
relevant sense ‘one’s own’, the question is whether such
interference, despite explicit consent, might run the risk of
negatively affecting people’s autonomy, and by extension,
their well-being (Ryan and Deci 2000).
This paper has three distinct aims. The first is to gen-
erate awareness with system designers that autonomous
e-coaching technologies have advanced to a point where
the suggestions for action that a system offers seriously
affect the options that users consider. In order to show this,
we build on recent work on option generation as found in
diverse disciplines such as philosophy, psychology and
computer science. Although this interdisciplinary approach
might at times seem to complicate issues, we believe that
e-coaching developers can strongly benefit from both the
conceptual distinctions made in philosophy and the
empirical findings gathered in the different fields discussed.
On the basis of such findings, it will for example become
clear that especially with systems that interact intensively
with a user, it quickly becomes difficult to distinguish
between those actions that were generated independently
by the user, and those that were steered (guided) by the
e-coaching system. Rather than casting judgement on
whether steering (guiding) is good or bad in general1, the
paper is concerned with the implications of the interplay
between a person’s options and the e-coaching system’s
suggestions. The second and third aims are to show that
understanding this interplay is crucial with respect to the
effectiveness of the system (Andrew et al. 2007) and the
ethical soundness of the system (Torning and Oinas-Ku-
kkonen 2009), respectively. This work also offers some
preliminary thoughts on how to think about making the
right type of suggestions.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2
reviews and discusses the growing attention for option
generation in different disciplines engaged in the study of
decision making. In Sect. 3, we explain how, on the basis
of the research done so far, the notions of ‘option’ and
‘option generation’ can be understood. In the three sections
thereafter, we argue that e-coaching systems have the ability
to influence the options that people consider (Sect. 4) and that
understanding the process of generating options as well as
the interplay between e-coaching and option generation is
important for designing and developing e-coaching systems
that are effective (Sect. 5) and respectful of people’s auton-
omy (Sect. 6). Finally, in Sect. 7, we conclude with a sketch
of the practical implications of this work and offer sugges-
tions for further research.
2 Existing work on option generation
in decision-making research
Although most situations seem to allow for countless
possibilities for action, there are limits to available infor-
mation, cognitive capacity and time that cause people to
consider only some of these as actual options, while
ignoring many others (Simon 1991). However, this raises
the question: How does one actually generate a set of
viable options for action?2 This important question has
strangely enough been ignored, or at least undervalued, for
a long time (Kalis et al. 2008; Smaldino and Richerson
2012). The more general question ‘which factors guide
human decision making?’ on the other hand, has been
studied extensively in different disciplines ranging from
philosophy and psychology to behavioral economics and
computer science. In this section, we aim to show how
current research on decision making in these different
disciplines is slowly increasing awareness that there is a
need to gain more insights into processes of option
generation.
Contemporary philosophical discussions on action focus
on questions such as what distinguishes acts from ‘mere
behavior’ (e.g., Thompson 2008; Setiya 2009) and how
decisions and intentions can lead to action in the physical
world (Mele 2009; Buckareff and Aguilar 2010). However,
most theories presuppose that people are able to see options
for action, choose one of them and act accordingly. The
question of how people generate options for action is only
recently gaining more philosophical attention (Kalis et al.
2008; Illies and Meijers 2009; Smith 2010). Smith, for
example, has introduced the notion of ‘practical imagina-
tion’ as the capacity of human beings to conceive or ‘see’
certain possibilities in their environment. However, he too
argues that the question why we ‘see’ certain possibilities
and not others has not been given sufficient thought in
philosophical theories of decision making. One plausible
approach to take toward an answer is to analyze research
on the role of emotions in decision making. It is well
known that emotions can make certain aspects of the
environment ‘stand out’ as particularly salient or attractive,
1 For a good discussion on this topic, see Verbeek (2011).
2 Please note that ‘generating options’ does not necessarily or even
primarily refer to explicit, conscious cognitive processes. Most of our
everyday decision making is largely automated and does not involve a
lot of explicit deliberation (Agre 1997; Bargh and Chartrand 1999). In
the rest of this paper, we use the term ‘option generation’ to refer to
any kind of process, explicit or implicit, that presents the actor’s
cognitive system with options for action.
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and as such, they might play a guiding role in the gener-
ation of options for action (Gibson 1979; Damasio 1999).
In other disciplines, a similar trend is discernible. Over
the years, empirical researchers in behavioral economics
and psychology have performed a great many studies to
learn more about people’s choice behavior (e.g., Thaler
1980; e.g., Thaler 1994; e.g., Kahneman et al. 1999; e.g.,
McGraw et al. 2010). However, many of these studies only
consider a single decision-maker dealing with a well-
defined problem space where the options for action are
either limited by the bounds of the experimental setup or
presented as a given. Consequently, the option generation
phase of decision making has often been confused with
option selection or ignored altogether, leading to the
undervaluation of option generation in this literature as
well. Notable exceptions are work by Gettys et al. on
hypothesis generation (Gettys et al. 1986) and Klein et al.
on option generation of skilled and non-skilled chess
players (Klein et al. 1995).
In everyday life, however, people are often confronted
with choice scenarios where options are not simply given,
but have to be generated. As Keller and Ho observed early
on, ‘many real decision tasks are ill defined, i.e., the
options, attributes, outcomes and states of nature are not
yet specified’ (Keller and Ho 1988, p. 715). Such tasks
force people to use heuristic strategies, such as the repre-
sentativeness heuristic of measuring ‘its similarity to a set
of common or previous problems stored in their long-term
memories’ (Keller and Ho 1988, p. 717) or the availability
heuristic where people ‘assess the likelihood of risks by
asking how readily examples come to mind’ (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008, p. 27). When faced with unfamiliar ill-
structured problems, however, one cannot use heuristic
strategies because there are no ‘prototypical or causal
patterns [...] stored in long-term memory,’ meaning that ‘a
menu of options is not readily accessible in memory and
actions cannot be quickly retrieved by searching memory’
(Keller and Ho 1988, p. 718). As Kalis et al. (2008) note, it
is plausible that this difference in familiarity conceptually
corresponds to the effort that is needed: in familiar or well-
constrained situations, option generation requires less
effort and might rely more on processes associated with—
more or less automatic—retrieval from long-term memory,
whereas in unfamiliar or complex situations option gener-
ation is more effortful and therefore relies more on pro-
cesses associated with executive function. It is these kinds
of cases, where the unfamiliarity, together with the open-
ness of the scenario force people to think of new options,
that have not received the scientific attention they deserve
(Johnson and Raab 2003; Ward et al. 2011; Smaldino and
Richerson 2012).
Very recently, Smaldino and Richerson have distin-
guished a range of factors involved in the process of option
generation in humans to clarify the problem. First, they
acknowledge an important role for the environment, stating
that options ‘are constrained by the potential behaviors
afforded by the environment’ (Smaldino and Richerson
2012, p. 4). Secondly, there are psycho-biological factors
such as perceptual biases, personality traits, affect, cogni-
tive biases (e.g., framing and anchoring effects Kahneman
and Tversky 2000), sex and age. Finally, there are socio-
cultural factors that play a role such as the drive to be
social, imitation, emotion contagion, communication and
culture itself. Their contribution is a positive indication that
the gap in our understanding of option generation has been
acknowledged and that researchers are working hard to
overcome this gap. However, Smaldino and Richerson will
be the first to also acknowledge that there is still a lot of
work to be done in order to acquire a full understanding of
the factors involved.
Within the domain of informatics and intelligent agent
systems, decision making is an important area of study
(e.g., Lakhmi and Nguyen 2009; e.g., Kamphorst et al.
2009; e.g., Gal et al. 2010). In this context, option gener-
ation has always played a role by necessity; for an agent
system, there is simply no escape from having a mecha-
nism that generates options. Interestingly, though, this
phase has often been taken together with action selection
architecture. Take for example a paper by Franklin and
Graesser in which they write that to describe an autono-
mous agent, one has to describe its environment, sensing
capabilities, actions, drives and ‘action selection architec-
ture’ (Franklin and Graesser 1997). In agent systems,
option generation will often involve a type of search
algorithm that goes through facts about prior experiences,
comparing characteristics against ones from the current
situation. A selection mechanism can then try to predict the
outcome of each of the (limited top set of) options and
weigh those outcomes to either make a decision to
select and exploit an option or to explore further options.
However, even though similar accounts have also been
proposed in models for human decision making (e.g., Daw
et al. 2006; e.g., Cohen et al. 2007), such approaches
do not sufficiently capture the complexity of the option
generation process in humans (Smaldino and Richerson
2012).3
In the young field of persuasive technology, options also
play an important, but often implicit role. Viewed from a
decision-making perspective, influencing the options that a
person considers is the primary target of systems that
generate suggestions for the user to follow. Consider for
3 Of course, Smaldino and Richerson’s argument against such
algorithms as a valid model of decision making does not necessarily
affect all agent systems, as many systems do not aspire to model
human behavior in the first place. The systems it does affect, however,
are those that aim to support people in their decision making.
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example the system developed by Kaptein et al. that targets
snacking behavior by tailoring text messages (SMS) on the
basis of an individual measure of susceptibility to different
social influence strategies (such as commitment or
authority) (Kaptein et al. 2012). Such systems specifically
aim to influence the options that the user considers (in this
case, the system tries to accomplish that the user will not
consider options that involve snacking). So far, however,
this aspect of the intervention has not been explicitly dis-
cussed in the literature.
In this section, we have shown that in the various dis-
ciplines studying decision making, the process of option
generation has received relatively little attention. In this
paper, we wish to show why this undervaluation is not
justified and that designers of autonomous e-coaching
systems should take care to consider the user’s options.
However, before we can develop our main claims on how
e-coaching affects option generation, there are fundamental
questions that should be answered first: What exactly are
‘options’ and what do we mean by ‘option generation’?
These questions will be addressed next.
3 Options and option generation
Existing studies on option generation use the term ‘options’
in different ways. Nevertheless, most authors seem—at
least implicitly—to adopt the view that options are repre-
sentations of candidates for action (Ward et al. 2011; Raab
et al. 2009). We share this view and will argue in this
section that options are a special subset of action repre-
sentations. We use the notion of action representations to
indicate anything (descriptions, images, objects) that rep-
resents an action. The proposal presented in this section is
based on a conceptual analysis developed in Kalis et al.
(2013). It should be noted that this analysis is not itself
based on empirical findings, but should be seen as a con-
ceptual proposal for structuring future studies on option
generation and e-coaching.
The first aspect of our analysis of options is that they are
candidates for action as seen from the perspective of the
actor. This means that options are distinct from objective
possibilities (Kalis et al. 2008, 2013). For example, when
someone considers to either watch a movie or read a book,
going grocery shopping is not an option, even though from
a third-person perspective it could be ascribed to that
person as a possible action to perform.
So, on our proposal, the actor must consider a certain
perceived possibility as a candidate for action, in order for
it to count as an option. This also implies that options are
not neutral action representations, but representations of
actions with a certain affective value. Options are not just
representations of possible things one could do (e.g., stop
in the middle of the street and stand on one foot for an
hour) but representations of possibilities that one actually
considers. That is, action representations that have at least
some positive value for the actor.
To further explicate what options are, it is useful to
relate them to more familiar constructs such as goals,
intentions and plans. Options, we contend, are different
from goals in that even though options have at least some
positive value for the actor, it is not the case that people
intend to bring about every option that they consider.
Taking an option into consideration does not imply any
form of commitment to actually realize it. Goals, on the
other hand, are often defined as representations of desired
end states that one intends to realize (Kruglanski and
Koepetz 2009).4 For the same reason, options are also
different from intentions and plans. As Bratman has noted,
both intentions and plans imply commitment and a certain
level of inertia, or unwillingness to change. That is, people
generally stick to their intentions and plans without
renewed deliberation (Bratman 1987, 2007). Options,
however, are very different in this respect. They are more
than just action representations in that they have affective
values attached to them, but they lack the type of com-
mitment that intentions and plans typically have. Options
are fleeting, ready to be rejected at the action selection
stage of decision making.
Now that we have provided a conceptual account of
options, we turn to the process of generating options. In
Kalis et al. (2013), it is argued that most researchers do not
think about option generation as a distinct psychological
process, but that there probably is a set of different psy-
chological processes providing an actor with candidates for
action. The processes involved might differ depending on
for example the familiarity or complexity of the decision-
making situation. In order to identify the relevant pro-
cesses, much more empirical work is needed; the limited
research available so far suggests that memory retrieval at
least seems to play an important role (Klein et al. 1995;
Kaiser et al. 2013). For a more detailed description of
existing work, see Kalis et al. (2008, 2013).
Our definition of options seems to indicate that in typ-
ical cases of decision making, generating options precedes
the intention formation and action stages. This does not
imply, however, that options cannot be informed by pre-
viously made decisions and plans. On the contrary, it is
very plausible that as a decision-making process pro-
gresses, option generation processes become increasingly
constrained by choices already made. To illustrate this,
consider the planning of a holiday. Early on, one may
consider many countries as viable options to travel to, but
4 This leaves open that there can be conflicting goals, leading to
questions of priority.
80 AI & Soc (2015) 30:77–88
123
once the decision has been made to travel by car, one’s
range of options will be automatically constrained by that
decision.
One might at this point be inclined to think that we
understand option generation as a form of conscious
deliberation. However, as stressed in Sect. 2, this is not the
case. Just as there are both conscious and implicit forms of
decision making, so too are there conscious and implicit
forms of option generation. For example, in an experiment
with medium skilled handball players, Johnson and Raab
found that ‘participants were not explicitly using particular
strategies to produce their first choice, generated options,
or final choice, indicated by many (over 30 % of partici-
pants) ‘‘reactive’’ responses such as doing ‘‘what came to
mind first’’ or responding ‘‘by intuition’’’ (Johnson and
Raab 2003, p. 223). What we suggest is that there is option
generation whenever there is decision making (either
implicit or explicit) and that option generation can be
understood as a dual-process model (cf. Verplanken et al.
1998; cf. Kahneman 2003; cf. Wood and Neal 2007). See
Fig. 1 for a schematic figure of such a model.5 It consists of
one direct feed that does not need any explicit attention (cf.
Kahneman’s fast and automatic System 1), and one that is
mediated by some attention-based, deliberative mechanism
(related to Kahneman’s System 2). This duality in the
model explains how at times people have a set of options to
choose from without having to consciously generate
options, whereas at other times people ‘stop and think’.
4 How e-coaching affects the options people consider
So far we have shown that there is a growing awareness in
different academic disciplines that option generation
should be incorporated in models of decision making. In
addition, we have proposed a way of understanding the
notions of ‘option’ and ‘option generation’. This brings us
to the first main aim of this paper: to show that e-coaching
systems influence the options that people consider.
Autonomous e-coaching systems are a class of decision
support systems designed to assist people with self-
improvement in a variety of areas (Warner 2012). Early
knowledge-based decision support systems (KBDSSs)
offered suggestions for decisions in complex, but reason-
ably well-defined problem spaces, aiding for example
medical diagnosis by processing clinical symptoms (e.g.,
Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984; e.g.. Barnett et al. 1987).
These suggestions, generated on the basis of rules, were
either exhaustive for that state of the domain or filtered on
the basis of heuristics for structuring the problem space or
optimizing the outcome. Today, there are decision support
systems that are much more sophisticated and deal with
uncertainty (Leal de Matos and Powell 2003) and changing
circumstances and environments (Ren et al. 2009; Pillac
et al. 2012). However, what we are concerned with in this
paper are systems that offer individuals personal coaching
in a domain of their everyday lives for an extended period
of time. Systems that, partly due to the recurrent nature of
the interactions, users will develop complex relationships
with that involve reciprocity and trust (Pruitt and Carnevale
1993; Lee and Nass 2010; Van Wissen et al. 2012).6 These
systems have the extremely difficult task of making ‘the
right suggestion at the right time’, while it is often not
unequivocally clear what would make a suggestion the
right one. Relevant is not only whether a proposed action
fits the person’s preferences and values and whether it
contributes to the fulfillment of a goal, but also how the
proposed action relates to the options that the person is
already considering.
Autonomous e-coaching systems influence people’s
decision making by offering suggestions for action in the
hope that the user will seriously entertain the idea of acting










Fig. 1 A dual system model of
option generation
5 For clarity of visual presentation, relations and feedback loops have
been left out.
6 It is important to note that these types of system are distinct from
recommender systems (Resnick and Varian 1997; Schafer et al. 1999;
Herlocker et al. 2004; Berkovsky et al. 2012). Such systems recom-
mend items, services or products (e.g., movie clips, restaurants,
books) by using collaborative filtering algorithms (Herlocker et al.
2004) that aggregate information from user communities about those
items. Where recommender systems help ‘identify content of interest
from a potentially overwhelming set of choices’ (Herlocker et al.
2004, p. 5) by looking at the decisions of others, e-coaching systems
try to identify actions that would be appropriate for a specific
individual to reach a certain goal (while running is an activity often
associated with health goals, it might be that ‘you should go for a run’
is not helpful at all for a user who endorses health goals, but who
simply hates running).
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different techniques for targeting automatic as well as
deliberative decision-making processes, these systems try
to persuade people to behave in a certain way (e.g., making
healthier food choices). But regardless of whether the
system targets automatic or deliberate processes, it will
necessarily affect the options people (consciously or not)
consider. Let us explain with two examples.
Consider Alice, a woman who is tired of being
overweight, but who nevertheless has a hard time mak-
ing decisions that will benefit her health. To help her
achieve a healthier lifestyle, Alice has employed an
e-coaching system that motivates her to be more active
throughout her day. For instance, when she enters the
building where she works on the second floor, the sys-
tem picks up her location by GPS and quickly derives
the conclusion that Alice is faced with a decision to
either take the elevator or the stairs. In line with Alice’s
goals, the system suggests she take the stairs via a text
message (e.g., ‘it would be great if you would take the
stairs instead of the elevator’).7 After having read the
message, there are two possibilities open to Alice, just as
there were before: She can either take the stairs or the
elevator. Her options, however, will have changed. Either
they will have changed in number—for example if she
had only automatically generated the option of taking the
elevator and only now considers taking the stairs—or in
affective value. For the suggestion will likely have
reminded Alice of her goal to be healthy and her
intention to be more active throughout the day. This goal
activation will at the very least lead her to reevaluate her
options.
In a similar vain, an example can be given of a
system influencing a person’s options in unconscious
decision making. Suppose Bob has employed an
e-coaching system that helps him go to bed on time. If
the system slowly dims the lights in the room, then that
is a natural cue for Bob that it might be time for bed.
Bob might not notice it consciously, but the system is
making a subtle suggestion, leading Bob into a state in
which he is not likely to consider starting another
activity. As was the case with Alice, Bob will entertain
different options and will also value certain options
differently because of the system’s suggestion.
So, it seems that e-coaching is tightly linked to the
options people consider. But why is this important? We
argue that it is important for two reasons. First, because
the options a person considers will matter for the
effectiveness of the system. Just consider a reversed
scenario for Alice, in which she was only considering
taking the stairs when she arrived at work. However,
receiving the text message makes her distinctly aware of
the tempting option to take the elevator, which she
decides to take as a reward for eating a light breakfast.
In this case, the e-coaching system’s suggestion had the
adverse effect! We come back to similar cases in Sect. 5.
Secondly, it is important because generating one’s own
options for action appears to be an important factor for
being an autonomous person who chooses his or her own
path in life. If interventions from e-coaching systems
interfere with the options people consider, an account
must be given either of how such interventions can be
justified, or why the worries are ungrounded. We return
to these difficult ethical concerns about autonomy in
Sect. 6.
5 Designing effective e-coaching systems
In this section and the next ones, we want to focus on
the following normative question: What kind of sug-
gestions should e-coaching systems offer to their users?
The main problem is that it is far from obvious what
makes a particular suggestion a good one. As Andrew
et al. have said, suggestion technology is about kairos:
‘providing the right information at the best time’
(Andrew et al. 2007, p. 259). But what exactly consti-
tutes the right information?
To answer this question, it would be very instructive
to understand how humans generate their options—
especially in unfamiliar, ill-defined choice scenarios—in
order to mimic and possibly even enhance this process in
the e-coaching system. As shown in the previous sec-
tions, there is a growing body of relevant research on
option generation in different fields such as philosophy
of action, psychology, behavioral economics and com-
puter science. Having a better understanding of this stage
of the decision-making process could help answer the
question what type of suggestions a system should make
in order to help the user to attain his goals. For instance,
should a system make suggestions that are very much in
line with the user’s behavior of the past or should it
make suggestions in line with the user’s goals, even if
that clashes with past behavior? And should the system
make suggestions that users would never have thought of
on their own or ones that the user would have generated,
but that were not salient enough to be selected? The
point here is that ‘the choice of tactic [for making
suggestions] to use for a particular product will be
important to the success of the product’ (Andrew et al.
2007, p. 260). So, in short, without a proper under-
standing of the human option generation mechanism, it
will be extremely difficult to know what kind of
7 For clarity, the example here involves a simple textual suggestion.
But as mentioned in Sect. 3, action representations can have other
forms as well.
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suggestions the e-coaching system should offer to be
most fitting for the individual.8 Knowing this is very
important, however, because the more fitting the sug-
gestion, the more persuasive power the system has (cf.
the suggestion principle in Oinas-Kukkonen and Har-
jumaa 2009). In addition, making the right suggestions
will improve the perceived expertise of the system,
which will also boost the system’s persuasive powers (cf.
the expertise principle in Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa
2009).
We think that (part of) the answer lies in focusing on the
options that a person might generate on one’s own. That is,
one of the things an e-coaching system should take into
account when preparing to make a suggestion is the range
of possibilities a user might consider as options. To see
how a lack of such information can lead to difficulties,
consider Carol, who employs an e-coaching system to help
her improve in making sound financial decisions. Suppose
she is looking to invest an inheritance from her late uncle.
If her e-coaching system suggests to make a risky but
possibly highly profitable investment that she, being a risk-
averse person, does not and would not consider an option,
she will either make a decision that goes against the grain
or ignore the advice she specifically employed the system
for. In either case, it is likely to harm the trust relation
between her and the system.
Another example is that of Dave, who desires to be
the kind of person that leads an active lifestyle, but who
needs external nudges to actually start being more active.
In order to achieve his goal, Dave employs an
e-coaching system that offers suggestions for various
activities. Suppose that one day Dave is one nudge away
from doing something active, but that he only considers
doing indoor activities because it is chilly outside. If the
system suggests to go for a run in the park, Dave will
dismiss this option and the system will have failed to
give the nudge that Dave wanted and needed to get
going.
It is important to note that in both examples, the sug-
gestions made by the system were made in the interest of
the users, in line with their overall goals. Moreover, the
suggestions may rationally and from a third-person per-
spective have been among the best possibilities available
for the user at the time—the best possible investment and
the best activity for burning calories, respectively. Still,
each system was not as effective as it could have been.
Earlier we said that options are always action possibil-
ities as seen from the perspective of the user. This means
that a support system cannot generate options: It can only
generate action possibilities that the user might or might
not adopt as options.9 To begin answering the questions put
above, we therefore think a good starting point would be
the following: Effective e-coaches suggest action repre-
sentations that would contribute to the fulfillment of the
goal set by the user, in such a way that it is most likely that
these representations will become viable options for the
user.
From the point of view of a support system that has to
generate and make suggestions for action for its user, four
categories of action representations can be distinguished.
First, there are action representations that the actor prob-
ably would come up with himself, regardless of being
supported, and which he evaluates at least somewhat pos-
itively (which would make them options for the user). An
empirical question here is what kind of effect making
suggestions of this category has: Either such suggestions
are redundant, or they help make a particular option more
salient. An example of suggestions being redundant is a
system that suggests to go for a run, when one has already
put one’s running shoes on. An example of the second type
is where one considers either going for a run (in accordance
with one’s goal to stay healthy) or watching television, and
is leaning toward the second option. When one receives a
suggestion to go for a run, this nudge might just help make
the option more salient, leading that person to the decision
to go running.
Secondly, a system could offer action representations
that the user would generate himself, but which he would
not endorse on any level. The prospective effectiveness of
this method is not very high: As long as the user does not
evaluate an action representation positively, he will not
consider that action as an option. The same applies to a
third possible method: A system offering action represen-
tations that the user would not generate himself and would
not endorse if suggested. Suggestions of this kind are likely
to lead to frustration with the system, because they try to
steer people toward actions they do not want to perform.
However, to see that such suggestions might also elicit a
positive effect, consider the following scenario. Two par-
ents tell a child every night to go to bed at ten o’clock,
whereas this is certainly not a positively valued option for
the child. On a particular evening while being alone,
around ten o’clock, the child thinks ‘my parents think that I
should go to bed now’—and more or less to the child’s own
surprise, the child decides to go to bed. In analyzing this
case, notice that there is no actual suggestion by the parents
on that specific night: The child is unsupervised but has
acted on the suggestion that has been offered to him or her
8 The possibility of determining optimal efficiency through the
method of trial-and-error is still open, but even that strategy is tedious
without a proper theoretical framework to place the results in.
9 Of course, a system that makes suggestions for action is likely to
influence the options that one considers. The point, however, that
systems cannot generate options as such, remains.
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so many times. A critical question is whether the generated
action representation (i.e., going to bed) really classifies as
an option, but the fact that the child acts upon it suggests
that it is. So, prima facie, it seems that in certain situations,
it is possible that mere exposure to a certain suggestion
after some time can lead to a positive evaluation of the
suggestion. This kind of behavior would be in line with
research on the ‘familiarity effect’ (e.g., Zajonc 1968) and
would also be another indicator that the iterative nature of
the interactions can play a substantial role in bringing about
effective behavior change (see Sect. 4).
Finally, a system could offer action representations that
the user would not generate, but would endorse once pre-
sented to him. These are the ones that Smaldino and
Richerson favor (see Sect. 5), where the result of the
coaching intervention is that the actor now has a wider
range of options than before. But how can a system
determine which action possibilities a user will find com-
pelling? Regarding this question, philosophical analyses
could provide a fruitful contribution. To give an example,
Illies and Meijers have developed an attractive framework
for thinking about the attractiveness of possible actions that
revolves around the notion of ‘Action Schemes’. An Action
Scheme, then, ‘is defined as the set of possible actions with
different attractiveness that is available to an agent or
group of agents in a given situation’ (Illies and Meijers
2009, p. 427). Illies and Meijers make two important
contributions. First, they acknowledge that the attractive-
ness of a specific action is the result of a myriad of factors.
They write: ‘it is influenced by the degree to which in a
certain context the action corresponds to the desires,
inclinations, or talents of an agent, with his previous his-
tory, his convictions, ideas, intuitions, and character’ (Illies
and Meijers 2009, p. 427). Secondly, they recognize that
technological artefacts—such as e-coaching systems—can
influence such Action Schemes, directly and indirectly, ‘by
modifying the set of possible actions available to her,
including their attractiveness’ (Illies and Meijers 2009,
p. 427). Their point is aimed at a much more general notion
of technological artifacts than we are concerned with in this
paper. However, given that e-coaching systems are a spe-
cies of technological artifacts, we can subscribe to their
observation that ‘[a]rtefacts do affect human actions,
obviously, but we cannot fully understand their profound
effects so long as we ignore their influence on the set of
actions available to an agent in a given situation, where
each option is presented in a certain attractive light’ (Illies
and Meijers 2009, p. 434).
So, summarizing, e-coaching systems cannot generate
and suggest options, only action representations that fall
into one of the four categories. Of all possible suggestions,
then, some will be more effective than others or will be
perceived more positively in terms of subjective
experience.
Consider again the question whether an e-coaching
system should make suggestions the user would never have
thought of on his own. Smaldino and Richerson suggest
that ‘advice is often most useful when it proposes options
that were not previously considered’ (Smaldino and Rich-
erson 2012, p. 7). They support this idea by citing work by
Page (2007), who has shown that ‘groups are often best
able to solve difficult problems when the constituent indi-
viduals are from diverse backgrounds, which increases the
number and breadth of available options’ (Smaldino and
Richerson 2012, p. 7). Offering these types of suggestion
may indeed turn out to be the most effective strategy.
However, it is important to note that with human
involvement, other considerations besides effectiveness
should also be taken seriously. The next section will
elaborate on ethical considerations about autonomy and
responsibility that play a role in the relationship between
human and e-coaching system.
6 Designing e-coaching systems that respect autonomy
E-coaching technologies touch upon a variety of ethical
concerns, such as privacy considerations (e.g., What data
are collected? How, where and for how long is it stored?
Who has access to it?), equal access and justice (e.g., How
can it be ensured that the technology not only benefits those
who can afford expensive equipment?) and responsibility
(e.g., Who is responsible for an action that was suggested
by an e-coach?). In addition, e-coaching technology raises
ethical questions about a person’s autonomy, because being
influenced in one’s decision making seems to be in conflict
with the classical understanding of self-directedness.
Because option generation is most prominently connected
to the ethical discussion about autonomy, for this paper we
limit ourselves to this topic.
Autonomy is a central (but complex) aspect of human
agency that we understand as having the freedom, the
capacity and the authority to choose one’s own paths in life
in accordance with one’s goals, values and preferences. To
begin with, it is important to distinguish between the ideal
of autonomy and the notion of perceived autonomy. The
former is the object of ethical theorizing; the latter is a
psychological measure of how free people perceive them-
selves to be. These concepts are strongly related, but not
identical: It is conceivable that a governmental decision
limits human autonomy, without anyone perceiving it as
such. Vice versa is it possible that people perceive a
decision as autonomy-limiting, while ethically it is not. In
this section, we discuss both kinds of autonomy and argue
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that both sides can have practical consequences for the
design of e-coaching systems.
Friedman has extensively argued for the inclusion of
human values such as autonomy into the design of software
and agent systems (Friedman and Kahn 1992; Friedman
1996; Friedman 1997; Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997;
Friedman et al. 2006). Her account of ‘user autonomy’ can
be considered a type of perceived autonomy (for example,
only if a user experiences difficulties with system com-
plexity will it affect autonomy), although she derives the
value of human autonomy from ethical theory. In a recent
article, Kamphorst has also argued for the importance of
human autonomy in system design, basing his argument on
the value that many societies place upon autonomy by
subscribing to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Kamphorst 2012). In addition, he makes the case that
human autonomy is especially important when designing
behavior-influencing e-coaching systems because those
often have both the capacity and the opportunity to impede
people’s autonomy.
In relation to option generation, there are many ques-
tions that are of yet unexplored. For instance, if a user
continuously follows suggestions that the user would never
have thought of on his or her own, how will this affect his
or her autonomy? In questions like this one, the previously
made distinction comes into focus. On the one hand, the
question can be conceived as an empirical one concerning a
user’s feelings of autonomy; whether unthought-of sug-
gestions influence how free people perceive themselves to
be. This question is open for empirical investigation. It is
an important issue too, because there is empirical evidence
suggesting that systems that limit people’s perceived
autonomy may over time turn out to be less effective,
because a diminished sense of autonomy can negatively
affect people’s well-being (Ryan and Deci 2000; Reis et al.
2000). In a similar vein, empirical questions can be asked
about the effect of such suggestions on self-efficacy as
well.
On the other hand, the question may be considered a
theoretical one about normative accounts of autonomy. As
discussed before, many such systems directly influence
people’s intention formation process, and intention for-
mation is generally seen as a central aspect of being
autonomous. Christman and Anderson for example state
that the core idea of autonomy is ‘being one’s own person,
to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions and
characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon
one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s
authentic self’’ (Christman and Anderson 2005, p. 3). In
this respect, Schechtman (2004) distinguishes between
different theoretical views on what it means to be such an
‘authentic self’. According to one view, it means being
guided by desires and ideas one explicitly endorses. In this
position, it makes no significant difference for autonomy
whether the suggestions one follows were made by others
or by oneself; what is important is that one acts on ideas
that one agrees with and embraces [for more on this notion
of endorsement, see the accounts of autonomy by Ricoeur
(1966); Frankfurt (1971); Dworkin (1988)]. However, on a
competing view on what an authentic self is, acting
authentically is acting on one’s own robust inclinations. On
such a view, it certainly makes a difference for autonomy
whether someone acts on his own impulses or on sugges-
tions offered by others, regardless of whether one considers
those suggestions to be good ones or not. This raises the
conceptual question under which conditions ‘external
support’ threatens autonomy—after all it is highly
implausible to suppose that autonomy necessarily pre-
cludes all external factors from playing a role in decision
making.
In this paper, we do not wish to take stance on either
side. Our point here is rather that there is an account to give
about the role of these external influences. Therefore,
developers should take into account the growing body of
empirical knowledge on option generation processes and
the factors that strengthen or suppress those processes.
Such knowledge can have important normative implica-
tions. For example, it might turn out that being offered
suggestions for action suppresses the agent’s internal
option generation processes (this is a point so far unstudied,
but consistent with research on self-determination and
motivation, see Ryan and Deci 2000). Such a finding would
imply that e-coaching makes the agent more dependent on
external support. If instead of strengthening a person’s own
decision-making process, e-coaching would replace it, this
would certainly be undermining the person’s autonomy.
With regard to e-coaching systems, this means that it is
important to be able to explain how e-coaching can happen
without impeding people’s autonomy. And, crucially,
should such findings present moral reasons to avoid certain
types of suggestions (recall the four categories from Sect.
5), then this ought to have practical implications for the
design of e-coaching systems. Moreover, in extension of
theoretical issues of autonomy are issues of responsibility,
because autonomy is generally viewed as a prerequisite for
ascribing responsibility (Anderson 2013). If we were to
hold that someone who is being coached is not acting
autonomously, how can we consider that person account-
able for actions that follow directly from being coached?
These are all important matters that deserve serious
attention.
Unfortunately, Torning and Oinas-Kukkonen have
shown that in general ethical considerations about persua-
sive systems have remained largely unaddressed (Torning
and Oinas-Kukkonen 2009). Not only is this a surprising
result, it is also slightly worrying. From a practical point of
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view, it is obvious that there is ample room for improve-
ment for many people in their decision making, and
employing support structures such as e-coaching systems
may make sense in some settings. We do not debate this.
But because autonomy is a central moral value in our
society, any system that limits a person’s autonomy
deserves ethical scrutiny: not every support strategy should
be considered equally permissible. Developing solid prac-
tices to measure the effects of e-coaching systems on
autonomy will take considerable collaborative effort by
theorists and empirical researchers. Our goal has been to
define the area of research and to raise the important issues.
7 Practical implications and future work
We have discussed a great diversity of material to support
our argument that human option generation is an important
area of study for designers and engineers of e-coaching
systems. Throughout the article, we have pointed toward
several areas for further scientific exploration, both
empirical and conceptual. In this final section, we will
conclude with a more focused research agenda for
improving the understanding of the interplay between
suggestions and options.
To begin, we see three major empirical challenges. The
first is to map out the effects that different types of
(computer-delivered) suggestions have on people’s option
generation processes. Such studies will require collabora-
tion between psychologists, cognitive scientists and system
engineers. Results from studies along these lines will pro-
vide insights into the questions discussed in Sect. 5.
The second is to develop computerized methods to accu-
rately predict the options that people will consider. Here,
scientists working on this problem can benefit from the expert
knowledge that psychologists and cognitive scientists have of
options and human option generation. In Sect. 3, we sug-
gested that option generation can be more or less constrained,
depending on the stage of the decision-making process. This
implies that e-coaching systems will also have to be able to
reason about how earlier decisions can affect the options that
the user will consider at a later time. Only when such pre-
diction and reasoning mechanisms about options exist, will
e-coaching systems be able to take full advantage of the
knowledge gained from the empirical work on how sugges-
tions affect options.
The third empirical challenge is to test whether and to
what extent certain types of suggestions affect how
autonomous people perceive themselves to be. In Sect. 6,
we explained that ethical considerations such as being
respectful of people’s autonomy should be taken into
account when designing e-coaching systems. Taking ethi-
cal considerations seriously also means including them in
empirical studies. For example, it would be insightful to
determine whether people perceive systems as more
autonomy-respectful if the system requires active partici-
pation of a user in the option generation process. Simply
offering suggestions A, B and C might diminish perceived
autonomy, whereas the possibility of adding options of
their own might strengthen their perceived autonomy.
Studying questions such as these is practically feasible and
a good way to learn more about how different suggestion
tactics can have different effects on people’s perceived
autonomy. As mentioned before, the ideal of autonomy
does not necessarily correspond to people’s perceived
autonomy. Nevertheless, results from such studies will feed
directly into theoretical work about autonomy and, later,
ethical assessment.
On the conceptual side, there is a major theoretical
challenge to provide a convincing account about whether
and under what conditions external support can threaten
autonomy (see Sect. 6). A solid theoretical framework will
help to make sense of empirical results. Moreover, should
such an account present moral reasons why certain types of
suggestions are undesirable, then this will have practical
implications for the design of e-coaching systems.
As things presently stand, it is too early to provide any
definite ethical guidelines for developing e-coaching sys-
tems. However, when gaps in our understanding about the
interplay between suggestions and options are (at least
partially) bridged, the state-of-the-art theories and empiri-
cal findings can be assessed to provide such guidelines.
To conclude, our goal has been to raise awareness for
important issues regarding autonomous e-coaching systems
and the interplay between suggestions and options. What is
evident from the research agenda is that to achieve progress
in this area, disciplinary boundaries will have to be crossed.
It is our hope that through interdisciplinary collaboration in
this field, developers and engineers of e-coaching systems
can improve their systems with regard to both effectiveness
and autonomy considerations.
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